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Abstract—P2P live media streaming systems have proliferated
and become indispensable vehicles for Internet based entertain-
ment applications. However, it is also well known that scalability
of such systems is limited by the lack of proper incentive
mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, it is notoriously hard to efﬁciently
allocate upload bandwidth at each peer so as to maximize overall
system performance.
In this paper, we propose a new auction based mechanism
for optimizing the allocation of upload bandwidth at each peer.
One of the distinctive features in our approach is that peers use
real “goods” (i.e., their own bandwidth resources) for payments,
instead of relying on some ﬁctitious currency. Essentially, peers
use a barter mechanism in the payment step in the auction.
Simulation results indicate that our proposed auction approach
consistently outperforms existing practical approaches (e.g., tit-
for-tat) in terms of average incoming stream rate, average
playback delay, and control packets ratio.
Index Terms—P2P, media streaming, upload bandwidth,
barter, auction, fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the blooming of P2P ﬁle sharing systems, such
as BitTorrent [1] and Emule [2], P2P media streaming has be-
come highly popular entertainment platforms. Indeed, practical
and commercial systems, such as PPStream [3], PPLive [4],
UUsee [5], and Coolstreaming [6], have become household
Internet tools.
However, while such systems are widely used, their perfor-
mances are far from being satisfactory, not to mentioned opti-
mized. For instance, the startup delay is usually unacceptably
large—can go all the way up to several minutes. Similarly,
the streaming rate can ﬂuctuate and becomes so low that the
display resolution is severely affected. Furthermore, in live
streaming system, the playback lag can also be unacceptably
large. As a case in point, in the recently held WorldCup, the
playback lag of some live streaming systems (e.g., UUsee)
was as high as ten minutes so that some people missed the
real-time events of the penalty shoot-out!
The root cause of the problem lies in the lack of proper
incentive schemes to motivate optimized contributions from
peers. Speciﬁcally, in P2P live media streaming systems,
packets from the source stream are usually just randomly
shared among peers, resulting in highly inefﬁcient bandwidth
usage. In other words, while bandwidth is used for transmitting
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the packets, such packets might not be needed, while some
needed packets have no contributor in the system.
Obviously, it would be highly desirable that an incentive
scheme is in place so that uploading bandwidth at each peer
is used in an optimized manner—contributing useful packets
to other needing peers.
It is important to observe that the resource to allocate is the
upload bandwidth from all the peers. On the other hand, the
value of such resource from each peer differs, mainly because
of the aging degree. For instance, a peer with fresh chunks is
obviously more popular.
Each peer in the system wants to get more high quality
resource which, by deﬁnition, is scarce. We need an efﬁcient
mechanism to do the match making. According to Bertsekas
[7], auction is an excellent candidate and is the focus of our
proposed approach.
There are many auction based approaches suggested for P2P
systems. Wu et al. [8], and Tan and Jarvis [9] modeled the P2P
streaming system as a market using auction so that each peer
in the system bids for upload bandwidth from others. However,
as in many other existing auction approaches, Wu et al. did
not give a clear statement about the maintenance of money.
Similarly, Tan and Jarvis introduced payment into the system
to assist the transaction among all the peers. Unfortunately,
this can lead to signiﬁcant overhead in maintaining each peer’s
currency.
In contrast, in our proposed approach, we use barter to
handle the payment issue. Speciﬁcally, the auctioneer, i.e., the
peer that is trying to allocate its upload bandwidth, accepts
payment from the winning bidder, i.e., another peer, in the
form of the latter’s upload bandwidth for the packets needed.
Different from in P2P video-on-demand streaming system,
where using real goods, which is the upload bandwidth at
each peer, for payment is very difﬁcult and it is hard to
get good performance because peers have different playback
points with large gap, in P2P live streaming system, using
real goods instead of relying on currency for payment can be
a good approach. In P2P live streaming system, peers in the
same channel always watch the “live” show and they share
similar resources. Therefore, we believe that such a barter
exchange mechanism is much more practical in a live P2P
streaming system because different peers will have a ﬁnite
non-overlapping time window of packets in need, thereby
giving the values to their own resources, i.e., the payments.
In this paper, we propose the Dynamic Bid Adjustment Auc-
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tion (DBA-Auction), which is based on the above mentioned
barter payment mechanism.
We summarize our contributions below.
∙ In the market model of our incentive mechanism, there
is not any form of money involved, thus avoiding a huge
and complex system for maintaining banking clearance
system, which is commonly needed in existing incentive
mechanisms using money.
∙ Auction is efﬁcient in the sense that the resource is
allocated at the highest valuation.
∙ Free-riding is impossible because every peer has to use
barter to exchange packets in need.
∙ Deciding the allocation amount is done dynamically
during the auction process, thereby avoiding the trouble
of price setting, which is a common problem in existing
auction algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
market model and the proposed DBA-Auction approach. In
Section III, we describe our simulation results. Section IV
gives the literature review. Finally, in Section V, we provide
some concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Market Model
We model the overlay network as a market. Each peer
involved in the overlay network is denoted as 𝑝𝑖. The upload
capacity of each peer is denoted as 𝑈𝑖, and the download
capacity is denoted as 𝐷𝑖. The minimum stream rate for
playback is 𝑆𝑝 and we assume that every peer involved in
the overlay network has download capacity 𝐷𝑖 larger than
𝑆𝑝. The neighbor list size of 𝑝𝑖 is denoted as 𝐶𝑖. Each peer
bids for upload bandwidth from other peers, and the payment
is their own upload bandwidth. Thus, in our market model,
every peer barters with each other for upload bandwidth to get
a steady streaming rate for playback. Any ﬁctitious currency is
not needed in our market model, thus avoiding the overhead of
maintaining each peer’s currency. The bid of peer 𝑝𝑖 is denoted
as 𝑏𝑖. This indicates that 𝑝𝑖 is obliged to trade 𝑏𝑖 packets for
one packet. We denote the barter ratio between 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑝𝑗 as
𝑡𝑖𝑗 , which means that when 𝑝𝑗 gives 𝑝𝑖 𝑘 packets, 𝑝𝑖 should
give back 𝑘 × 𝑡𝑖𝑗 packets for payment. Note that 𝑡𝑗𝑖 = 1𝑡𝑖𝑗 .
After 𝑝𝑖 accepts the bid 𝑏𝑗 of 𝑝𝑗 , the barter ratio 𝑡𝑗𝑖 = 𝑏𝑗 . In
our market model, each peer could behave as a bidder and an
auctioneer simultaneously as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Two concurrent auctions in a P2P live media
streaming system.
There are two concurrent auctions in Figure 1. Auction 1
has 𝑝4 as the auctioneer and there are four bidders: 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝5,
and 𝑝6. Auction 2 has 𝑝7 as the auctioneer and there are also
four bidders: 𝑝3, 𝑝4, 𝑝6, and 𝑝8. We can see that 𝑝4 acts as an
auctioneer in auction 1 and as a bidder in auction 2.
Speciﬁcally, there are two stages in our system model:
auction stage during which the neighbor relationships and the
barter ratios are established, and barter stage during which the
real transaction is conducted. Barter stage is on the basis of
auction stage.
B. Auction Stage
In the auction stage of our system model, only the neigh-
bor relationships and the barter ratios are established. The
allocation amount and the speciﬁc packets for barter are not
determined at this stage. Instead, peers dynamically decide the
allocation amount and the speciﬁc packets for barter during the
barter stage, which will be elaborated in detail in Section II-C.
Each peer in the system maintains a list of neighbors with
a size not larger than 𝐶𝑚, i.e., 𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝑚. As soon as one peer
joins the overlay network, it begins to ﬁnd neighbors to get
needed packets in the stream for playback. Peers also check
their neighbor lists periodically. When there are neighbors
which do not behave according to their agreements made in
the auction stage, these peers will be deleted from the neighbor
list. Furthermore, when the size of the neighbor list is smaller
than 𝐶𝑚, the peer will start ﬁnding new neighbors.
A peer in need of new neighbors can get a list of peers from
the well known trackers. Subsequently the peer selects peers
randomly from the neighbor list, and sends its bid to them. The
auctioneer who decides to accept the peer’s bid will add this
peer into its neighbor list and send an acknowledgment mes-
sage to this peer. (The auctioneer behaviors will be presented
in detail in Section II-B2.) After receiving an acknowledgment
from the auctioneer it has sent a bid to, the peer will add this
auctioneer into its neighbor list. The neighbor relationship and
the barter ratio are therefore established.
1) Bid Adjustment: In P2P live media streaming system,
each peer tries to get enough packets from the stream to
ramp up its incoming rate as quickly as possible. To get a
higher incoming stream rate, the peer should give a higher
bid. Indeed, in order to quickly ram up its incoming stream
rate, the peer should at the outset give the highest bid it can
offer, instead of increasing the bid little by little. On this basis,
we propose a dynamic bid adjustment strategy and we call the
auction mechanism using this dynamic bid adjustment strategy
Dynamic Bid Adjustment Auction (DBA-Auction).
In DBA-Auction, when 𝑝𝑖 sends a bid to other peers, it
always uses the highest bid value which is the highest barter
ratio it can offer, i.e., 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑡∗𝑖 . We use 𝑡
∗
𝑖 to denote the highest
barter ratio of 𝑝𝑖. In DBA-Auction, the highest barter ratio
of 𝑝𝑖 is calculated according to Equation (1). As shown in
Equation (1), 𝑡∗𝑖 is calculated dynamically in DBA-Auction.
𝑡∗𝑖 =
𝑈𝑖 −𝑂𝑖
𝑆𝑝 − 𝐼𝑖 (1)
Here, 𝑈𝑖 denotes the upload capacity of 𝑝𝑖, 𝑆𝑝 denotes the
minimum stream rate for playback in the system, 𝑂𝑖 denotes
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the overall outgoing stream rate of 𝑝𝑖 and 𝐼𝑖 denotes the
incoming stream rate which is deﬁned in Section III-B. For
example, in a system with a minimum stream rate for playback
of 300kbps, at a certain moment, one peer with upload capacity
of 384kbps has the overall outgoing stream rate of 104kbps
and the incoming stream rate of 150kbps. Then the highest
barter ratio of this peer at this moment is 384−104300−150 =
28
15 .
2) Auctioneer Behaviors: In our system model, the auction-
eer does not preserve any bids. Instead, it deals with each bid
the moment it receives the bid as shown in Figure 2. In the
example of Figure 2, we have 𝐶𝑚 = 3, which means that each
peer in this system maintains a neighbor list with a size not
larger than 3. Peer 𝑝3 has a full neighbor list and is conducting
transactions with the neighbors on the list. When 𝑝3 receives
a new bid 𝑏5 = 2 from another peer 𝑝5, it compares the new
bid with the neighbors on its neighbor list and ﬁnds that 𝑏5 is
larger than 𝑏4 = 1. Thus, 𝑝3 stops the transaction with 𝑝4 and
removes 𝑝4 from its neighbor list and adds 𝑝5 to its neighbor
list.
This process of dealing with new bids at one peer is
formalized in Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 2: The auctioneer behaviors when a new bid comes.
Algorithm 1 The algorithm at 𝑝𝑖 as an auctioneer
1: while 𝑝𝑖 receives a new bid 𝑏𝑗 from another peer 𝑝𝑗 do
2: if 𝑏𝑗 ≥ 1𝑡∗𝑖 then
3: if 𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝑚 then
4: Insert 𝑝𝑗 into the neighbor list and send an ac-
knowledgment message to 𝑝𝑗 ;
5: else
6: if 𝑏𝑗 > 𝑏𝑘, 𝑝𝑘 is the peer with the smallest bid
value on the neighbor list of 𝑝𝑖 then
7: Delete 𝑝𝑘 and then insert 𝑝𝑗 into the neighbor
list, send disconnect message and acknowledg-
ment message to 𝑝𝑘 and 𝑝𝑗 , respectively;
8: else
9: Discard 𝑏𝑗 ;
10: end if
11: end if
12: else
13: Discard 𝑏𝑗 ;
14: end if
15: end while
C. Barter Stage
After the neighbor relationship and the barter ratio are
established in auction stage, real transaction is conducted
between the peers at barter stage. In our system model, the
allocation amount and the speciﬁc packets for barter are not
ﬁxed in auction stage. Instead, they are determined during the
barter process.
1) Bid-oriented Request Mechanism: In our system model,
peers do not share buffer maps unless they are neighbors,
avoiding a lot of control packets overhead of updating buffer
map packets. After the neighbor relationship is established,
peers send buffer maps to each other. The request mechanism
in our system is bid oriented. When one peer wants to request
a speciﬁc packet, it checks the buffer maps of all its neighbors
and gets a list of neighbors which have this packet, then sends
the request to the neighbor with the highest bid value on the
list. Therefore, one peer could barter for more packets with
the neighbor which has higher barter ratio thus achieves the
aim of using the least upload capacity to get the most packets
from others. By adopting this bid-oriented request mechanism,
peers could get more valuable packets without contributing
excessive upload bandwidth.
We compared the performance of bid-oriented request
mechanism and random request mechanism, in which one peer
sends packet requests to its neighbors randomly. We use the
same simulation setup as that in Section III-C. The results are
shown in Figures 3 to 5.
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Fig. 3: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
average incoming stream rate over time.
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Fig. 4: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
average playback delay over time.
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Fig. 5: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
control packets ratio over time.
In Figures 3 to 5, we can easily see that bid-oriented request
mechanism outperforms random request mechanism in terms
of average incoming stream rate, average playback delay and
control packets ratio. The bid-oriented request mechanism has
much higher average incoming stream rate, much lower control
packets ratio, and consistently lower playback delay than
random request mechanism during the simulation duration.
2) Barter Management Mechanism: We also design a barter
management mechanism to ensure peers conduct transactions
according to the barter ratio they established in auction stage.
In our system model, each peer preserves the transaction
records of all the neighbors. We denote the overall number
of stream packets sent from 𝑝𝑖 to 𝑝𝑗 as 𝑁
𝑝
𝑖𝑗 . This process of
dealing with new packet requests at one peer is formalized in
Algorithm 2. 𝛿 and 𝜎 are two thresholds.
Algorithm 2 The barter management algorithm at 𝑝𝑖
1: while 𝑝𝑖 receives a packet request from its neighbor 𝑝𝑗
do
2: if 𝑁𝑝𝑖𝑗 −𝑁𝑝𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝛿 or
𝑁𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑝𝑗𝑖
≤ 𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜎 then
3: Send this packet to 𝑝𝑗 ;
4: else
5: Discard this request;
6: end if
7: end while
According to Algorithm 2, each peer 𝑝𝑖 has a tolerance
range (𝛿, 𝜎) to its neighbors. The rationale is that 𝑝𝑖 does
not stop uploading to 𝑝𝑗 if the barter difference 𝑁
𝑝
𝑖𝑗 −𝑁𝑝𝑗𝑖 is
smaller than or equal to 𝛿 or the barter ratio
𝑁𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑝𝑗𝑖
is smaller
than or equal to 𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜎. This barter management mechanism
encourages neighbors to conduct transactions in an honest
manner; otherwise, the peer who does not cooperate will be
punished by its neighbor through choking, meaning that its
neighbor will stop uploading packets to it.
Realistically, one peer tends to make its own tolerance
range very tight due to selﬁshness. Each peer doesn’t want
to contribute more to its neighbor than their contract, thus in
realistic environment, the tolerance range of each peer must be
very tight. We tested four sets of tolerance range (𝛿, 𝜎) which
are from loose to tight: (3000, 0.1), (1000, 0.01), (500, 0.001),
and (100, 0.0001). Through these experiments, we proved that
the performance of our DBA-Auction approach does not rely
on the tightness of tolerance range of each peer. We use the
same simulation setup as that in Section III-C. The results are
shown in Figures 6 to 8.
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Fig. 6: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
average incoming stream rate over time.
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
average playback delay over time.
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Fig. 8: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
control packets ratio over time.
In Figures 6 to 8, we can easily see that there is hardly any
difference among the results of the four sets of tolerance range
in terms of average incoming stream rate, average playback
delay, and control packets ratio during the simulation duration,
which means that even when the peers adjust their tolerance
range to very tight values the performance of the system
doesn’t be affected. In this paper, we use (100, 0.0001) as
the tolerance range of each peer for DBA-Auction approach.
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III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
In our simulation study, we use the well known and highly
practical simulator p2pstrmsim [10], which is originally
developed by Zhang et al.. We implemented our proposed
mechanism on top of this simulator and conducted a series
of simulation scenarios.
In our simulated system model, there is only one source
server which has an upload capacity of 600 kbps. There
are three kinds of peers with different upload and download
capacity as shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Three types of peers and their fractions in the
system.
Fraction Upload Capacity (kbps) Download Capacity (kbps)
0.15 1000 3000
0.39 384 1500
0.46 128 768
The raw stream rate of the source server is 300 kbps. The
stream packet size is ﬁxed at 1250 bytes. Each peer has a
request window with a size of 20 seconds.
B. Performance Metrics
In our simulation study, we use the following performance
metrics.
∙ Average incoming stream rate: Incoming stream rate is
the net incoming stream rate of one peer, excluding
redundant packets, overdue packets, control packets, etc.
Average incoming stream rate is then the average of the
incoming stream rates of all the peers involved in the
system during the simulation duration. A peer which has
a higher incoming stream rate has a better display quality.
∙ Average playback delay: Playback delay is the delay from
the moment one packet is sent out from the source server
to the moment this packet is played at one peer. Average
playback delay indicates the average playback delay of
all the packets which are played successfully during the
simulation duration.
∙ Control packets ratio: This is the ratio of average control
stream rate to average download stream rate. Control
packets ratio is a measure of the control overhead im-
posed by the system.
C. Performance Comparison with Tit-for-Tat
We compared the performance of our proposed incentive
mechanism with the widely used tit-for-tat approach. We
implemented the tit-for-tat strategy according to the algorithm
described in [11]. In the tit-for-tat strategy, peers do “equiv-
alent reciprocate” to each other. One peer stops uploading to
the other one when it does not cooperate, without stopping
downloading from that peer.
In this experiment, there are 200 nodes in the system, and
the simulation duration is 45 minutes. We measured three
performance metrics: average incoming stream rate, average
playback delay and control packets ratio. The results are
shown in Figures 9 to 11.
In Figure 9, we can see that the average incoming stream
rate of DBA-Auction approach is consistently higher than that
of tit-for-tat with a huge gap during the simulation duration.
During the simulation duration, the average incoming stream
rate of DBA-Auction is around 250 kbps which is good and
steady while the average incoming stream rate of tit-for-tat is
under 150 kbps and ﬂuctuant with time.
Figure 10 shows that DBA-Auction approach has a rela-
tively low average playback delay during the duration, below
40000 msec. Speciﬁcally, it consistently outperforms tit-for-
tat.
Figure 11 shows that DBA-Auction has much lower control
packets ratio than tit-for-tat. During the simulation duration,
the control packets ratio of DBA-Auction has a very steady
value which is around 0.06 while the control packets ratio of
tit-for-tat is above 0.5 during the ﬁrst 16 minutes and around
0.2 during the last 29 minutes.
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Fig. 9: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution of
average incoming stream rate over time.
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Fig. 10: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution
of average playback delay over time.
In Figures 9 to 11, we can easily see that DBA-Auction
exhibits much higher performance in terms of average incom-
ing stream rate and control packets ratio, and also consistently
outperforms tit-for-tat in terms of average playback delay. The
major reason is that in the tit-for-tat strategy, peers barter with
each other with the barter ratio 1:1. Consequently this strategy
cannot encourage peers to contribute more upload bandwidth
to the system. A peer only contributes when it can get the
same amount of available upload bandwidth from other peers.
However, in our auction strategy, peers can get more upload
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Fig. 11: Performance comparison in terms of the evolution
of control packets ratio over time.
bandwidth from other peers if they offer a higher barter ratio.
Thus, all the peers are encouraged to contribute more upload
bandwidth to the system. The whole amount of available
upload bandwidth is obviously much more than that in tit-
for-tat incentive systems, thus the average incoming stream
rate is signiﬁcantly higher than that in tit-for-tat strategy.
Moreover, in our auction strategy, if neighbor relationship is
established between two peers, they will hold this relationship
for a reasonably long time and conduct transactions according
to the agreement they have made during the auction stage.
Therefore, the performance of DBA-Auction is consistent and
stable during the simulation duration.
D. The Analysis of System Resistance to Dishonest Behaviors
Nearly all the existed P2P systems suffer from dishonest
behaviors of peers, and dishonest behaviors can lead to sig-
niﬁcant performance degradation of the system. In this section,
we study the system resistance of DBA-Auction approach,
by comparing the average incoming stream rate between
honest peers which behave according to the aggrements they
make with their neighbors and dishonest peers which only
get packets from their neighbors and never answer their
neighbors’ requests. We use the same simulation setup as that
in Section III-C. 20% of the peers are dishonest peers. The
results are shown in Figure 12.
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Fig. 12: The comparison of average incoming stream rate
between honest peers and dishonest peers.
In Figure 12, We can see that the average incoming stream
rate of dishonest peers is only around 120 kbps which has a
large performance gap with the result of honest peers whose
average incoming stream rate is around 170 kbps.
We can see that in the DBA-Auction mechanism, dishonest
peers get much lower incoming stream rate than peers who
behave honestly, meaning that DBA-Auction approach has
certain degree of resistance to dishonest behaviors. In DBA-
Auction approach, each peer maintains a transaction record
for each of its neighbors. After the neighbor relationship is
established between two peers in the auction stage, one peer
only answers the requests from its neighbor when their trans-
action record is in its tolerance range. Therefore, dishonest
peers can only get very small amount of packets which are
in the tolerance range of its neighbors. Dishonest peers have
to change their neighbors continuously to get free packets by
cheating. However, the tolerance range of the peers in the
system is very tight due to the selﬁshness of each peer, thus
dishonest peers can never get as many packets as honest peers.
E. The Analysis of Scalability
P2P live media streaming system is becoming more and
more popular nowadays, and it is very common that thousands
of peers watches the same program in the system simultane-
ously. Thus, a good incentive mechanism which is designed
for P2P live media streaming must have a good scalability.
In this section, we study the scalability of DBA-Auction with
comparison with tit-for-tat. We investigate the cases of 200,
500, 1000, 5000, and 8000 peers. We use the same simulation
setup as that in Section III-C, with varying number of peers.
The results are shown in Figures 13 to 15.
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Fig. 13: The comparison of average incoming stream rate
with varying number of peers.
Figure 13 shows that as the number of peers grows, there
is hardly any performance reduction in terms of average
incoming stream rate when DBA-Auction is applied. Although
there is a little performance promotion as the number of peers
grows when tit-for-tat is applied, the average incoming stream
rate of DBA-Auction is much higher.
Figure 14 shows that as the number of peers grows, the av-
erage playback delay of DBA-Auction increases. Nonetheless,
we can easily see that DBA-Auction is better than tit-for-tat in
all the ﬁve cases. The average playback delay of DBA-Auction
is still acceptable when the number of peers increases to 8000.
In Figure 15, we can see that the control packets ratio of
DBA-Auction is much lower than tit-for-tat in all the ﬁve
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Fig. 14: The comparison of average playback delay with
varying number of peers.
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Fig. 15: The comparison of control packets ratio with
varying number of peers.
cases. Moreover, as the number of peers increases, the control
packets ratio of DBA-Auction has hardly any increase.
IV. RELATED WORK
A lot of incentive mechanisms have been designed for P2P
media streaming systems.
Lin et al. [12] conducted incentive method based on barter
between two peers using game theoretic method with barter
ratio 1:1 directly. Unfortunately, in P2P live media stream-
ing system, there are many peers who do not have enough
upload bandwidth capacity to exchange sufﬁcient streaming
rate for playback. Lin and Cheng [13] presented a barter
mechanism with a server grant mechanism to help peers
which are deﬁcient in upload capacity, so that the server will
facilitate peers newly joined according to the workload of the
system. However, this server mechanism has a problem of
scalability. For example, a system with thousands of peers need
a very large source server capacity to conduct this mechanism
effectively.
Liu et al. [14] proposed an incentive mechanism in which
peers who contribute more upload bandwidth to the system
receive higher quality service than those who contribute less.
Thus, in this mechanism peers will receive differentiated
stream services according to their contribution levels to the
system. Habib and Chuang [15] designed a rank-based peer
selection mechanism to punish the behavior of free-riding
and encourage contribution. In this mechanism, peers have
different ranks according to their contribution level, and peers
with higher ranks will have more ﬂexibility to select neighbors
while free-riders have very limited options in selecting neigh-
bors. However, both mechanisms above have the problem of
fairness, leading to performance gap between rich and poor
peers. A peer with small upload bandwidth could be starved
even if it contributed all the available upload bandwidth.
Chu et al. [16] proposed a taxation strategy, which is like
the taxation system in human society. In this strategy, rich
peers who have more resources are obliged to contribute
more to the system and poor peers could contribute less. This
mechanism has similar problems with the real taxation system
in human society, namely the signiﬁcant overheads incurred by
the management. Rahman et al. [17] proposed another effort-
based incentive mechanism which decides the contribution
level of a peer according to the relative contribution which
is the fraction of its upload capacity, instead of absolute
contribution to implement a system which is both fair and
efﬁcient. Unfortunately, this strategy also has the problem
of supervision. The system for supervision could lead to a
lot of overhead and it could be very hard to guarantee the
effectiveness of the supervision.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a new auction approach for
P2P live media streaming system which is modeled as a free
market. In our model, peers take part in simultaneous auctions
for upload bandwidth from other peers, and no ﬁctitious
currency is involved. In DBA-Auction there are two stages
which are auction stage and barter stage, and bidders change
their bids dynamically according to the realtime incoming
streaming rate they desire and the realtime available upload
bandwidth they have.
In real life where money is used, there are quite a wide
variety of goods, thus, it is necessary and effective to use
money. However, in P2P live media streaming system, there
is only one kind of goods, which is upload bandwidth and all
the peers share similar resources which makes barter possible.
We believe that “simple is great”. If a simpler way can make
a system work well, all the more complex methods should be
avoided.
We have conducted extensive simulation performance eval-
uation to evaluate our auction mechanism. According to the
simulation results, our auction mechanism has very good per-
formance in terms of average incoming stream rate, average
playback delay and control packets ratio compared to the
widely used tit-for-tat mechanism. In particular, the DBA-
Auction mechanism not only has better performance than tit-
for-tat strategy, but also effectively handles the problem of
dishonest behaviors of peers, which is a very common and
severe problem in incentive mechanisms for P2P live media
streaming systems. The simulation results also show that our
mechanism is scalable.
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